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INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE:
A TORT THAT EVISCERATES THE REAL
ESTATE BROKERS' STATUTE OF FRAUDS
I. INTRODUCTION
More than a century ago, the California Legislature en-
acted the real estate brokers' statute of frauds.' Today codi-
fied as Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (d), this act ex-
plicitly renders any unwritten agreement employing a broker
to purchase or sell lands for compensation invalid.2 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in 1987, characterized section 1624(d)
as perhaps the state's first "consumer protection statute."3
Beyond the certainty typically afforded by statute of
frauds legislation, the state supreme court has identified two
further aims which are promoted by signed writings in the
real estate brokerage setting.4 Written brokerage agree-
ments shield sellers and buyers from: (1) the imposition of
unwanted brokerage relationships and resultant liability for
commissions;5 and (2) the unfounded and multiple claims es-
pecially prevalent in the real estate service sector.6
As licensees who have met educational and examination
requirements, brokers are conclusively presumed to be aware
of and to understand section 1624(d). 7 Despite this knowl-
edge, many brokers routinely ignore the law by relying upon
1. Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279, 1288 (Cal. 1987).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(d) (West Supp. 1996).
The following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or
memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be
charged or by the party's agent:
(d) An agreement authorizing or employing an agent, broker, or
any other person to purchase or sell real estate ... for compensation or
a commission.
Id.
3. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1289.
4. Id. at 1289-90.
5. See infra part II.A.1.
6. See infra part II.A.2.
7. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1286.
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unwritten fee agreements. 8 Faced with this frustrating real-
ity, the high court today evidences little sympathy for brokers
who refuse to obtain their brokerage contracts in writing.9
This stern attitude reflects a growing reluctance on the
part of California courts to award compensatory damages to
brokers who ignore their legal duties.10 Moreover, strict ap-
plication of the real estate brokers' statute of frauds effectu-
ates the legislature's recently heightened desire to protect
consumers by insisting upon documented transactions,'" and
specifically safeguards those requiring real estate brokerage
services. 12
These judicial and legislative trends are at odds, how-
ever, with the California Supreme Court's 1975 decision of
Buckaloo v. Johnson.13 There, a broker sought to recover a
commission purportedly earned under an unwritten seller/
broker contract.' 4 Although the statute of frauds sheltered
the seller, the broker circumvented the need for a signed
writing by claiming the buyer had interfered with his expec-
tancy of compensation.' 5 The supreme court agreed, ruling
that an unwritten commission agreement - despite its unen-
forceable nature - will sustain a broker's action based upon
intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage.16
8. See infra part II.A.3.
9. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1290.
10. See, e.g., Huijers v. DeMarrais, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232 (Ct. App. 1992)
(refusing to award commission where broker failed to provide agency disclosure
statement); Renaissance Realty, Inc. v. Soriano, 174 Cal. Rptr. 837 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1981) (refusing to award commission where broker violated fiduciary
duty to disclose net listing).
11. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1289-90 (listing consumer contracts now required
to be in writing to demonstrate this "clear legislative purpose").
12. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10176(f) (West 1994) (mandating
that definite termination date be specified in all exclusive listings for which a
real estate license is required) (enacted 1945); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 10147.5 (West 1994) (establishing negotiability and notice requirements for
real estate commission contracts) (enacted 1979); CAL. CirV. CODE § 2079.14
(West Supp. 1996) (imposing duty on brokers in residential transactions to pro-
vide parties with written agency disclosure) (enacted 1986).
13. 537 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1975), overruled by Della Penna v. Toyota Motor
Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
14. Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 868.
15. Id. at 872.
16. Id. at 873.
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In Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 7 de-
cided on October 12, 1995, the California Supreme Court
overruled Buckaloo v. Johnson."8 The Buckaloo decision, au-
thored by Justice Mosk for a unanimous supreme court in
1975, had stood for twenty years. 19 To the extent that the
Buckaloo holding permitted a plaintiff to recover without
showing any hint of wrongful conduct on the part of the de-
fendant, however, it was disapproved. 20 After Della Penna, a
plaintiff must show wrongful conduct as an element of the
tort.
2
'
The Della Penna majority, however, reserved considera-
tion of the type of wrongful conduct required for another
day. 22 Whether a plaintiff will be required to prove, for exam-
ple, "that the defendant's conduct amounted to an indepen-
dently tortious act, or was a species of anticompetitive behav-
ior proscribed by positive law, or was motivated by unalloyed
"23malice, remains unknown.
This comment, like the Della Penna decision, is highly
critical of the Buckaloo decision's creation of liability absent
wrongful conduct by the defendant, specifically in the real es-
tate brokerage context.24 This is the factual setting for the
Buckaloo opinion, while Della Penna concerned an automo-
bile wholesaler-plaintiff and an auto manufacturer-defend-
ant.25 Long-standing statutory authority requires all real es-
tate brokerage contracts to be in writing and signed by the
party to be charged.26 The permissive cause of action fash-
ioned in Buckaloo undermined the sound policy considera-
tions promoted by requiring real estate brokers to obtain
signed writings.27
As explained in part II, the Buckaloo facts should have
led to an explicit exploration of two conflicting doctrines. 28
17. 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
18. Della Penna, 902 P.2d at 751 n.5.
19. Id. at 748-49.
20. Id. at 751 n.5.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 741.
23. Della Penna, 902 P.2d at 741.
24. See discussion infra part IV.
25. Della Penna, 902 P.2d at 742-43.
26. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1624(d) (West Supp. 1996).
27. See discussion infra part IV.
28. See infra part II.C.4. See generally Harvey S. Perlman, Interference
with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract
1996] 1221
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One doctrine - embodied in the real estate brokers' statute
of frauds - protects the public by insisting on signed broker-
age contracts.2 9 The countervailing doctrine - embodied in
the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage - protects brokers who suffer the loss of an ad-
vantageous relationship due to the acts of a malicious inter-
loper.3 0 Remarkably, however, the Buckaloo court focused
exclusively upon the broker's harm and ignored the policy
considerations supporting the real estate brokers' statute of
frauds.3 1
Twenty years later, hindsight reveals that the Buckaloo
court's indifference toward section 1624(d) stemmed from the
grave uncertainty that engulfed that statute in 1975.2 The
gradual development of the equitable estoppel doctrine as a
bar against certain statute of frauds defenses created serious
questions about the vitality of the century-old statute. 33
These very questions were the subject of vociferous academic
debate at the time of the Buckaloo decision, and remained
unanswered by the supreme court until the Phillippe v.
Shapell Industries3 4 decision more than a decade later.35
Ultimately, in Phillippe, the supreme court unequivo-
cally rejected equitable estoppel as a means of circumventing
the real estate brokers' statute of frauds.3 6 Instead, the high
court propounded the statute's "sound policy considerations"
for the first time.3 7 With the salutary aims of section 1624(d)
in mind, part III highlights the need for a post-Phillippe anal-
ysis of the Buckaloo holding. 8
Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 123-24 (1982) (highlighting the need for courts
to craft rules that both prevent fraudulent claims by brokers and prevent trans-
acting parties from unjustly appropriating brokers' efforts).
29. See Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279, 1289 (Cal. 1987).
30. Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865, 872 (Cal. 1975), overruled by Della
Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
31. See id. at 868-73.
32. See infra part IV.B.
33. See infra part II.B.2. At the time, highly respected commentators were
calling upon the California Supreme Court to judicially abrogate § 1624(d). See,
e.g., HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL
ESTATE § 1.54 n.8 (1975) (arguing that equitable estoppel should be allowed to
defeat § 1624(d)).
34. 743 P.2d 1279 (Cal. 1987).
35. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1279.
36. Id. at 1284-88.
37. See id. at 1289-90 & n.12.
38. See infra part III.
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Part IV offers such an analysis, ultimately suggesting
that the Phillippe court's fortification of section 1624(d) is ir-
reconcilable with the current form of the Buckaloo tort.39
Specifically, it makes no sense to continue to allow brokers
barred from recovering against their promisors by section
1624(d) to nevertheless recover their fees from other trans-
acting parties (i.e. sellers and buyers) without requiring a
hint of misrepresentation. 40  Because transacting parties
stand in the same financial position with respect to the pay-
ment of brokerage expenses, this tort eviscerates the real es-
tate brokers' statute of frauds.41
Therefore, in part V, a method is proposed to reconcile
the Della Penna decision and the Buckaloo decision with the
real estate brokers' statute of frauds, California Civil Code
section 1624, subdivision (d). Specifically, brokers should no
longer be allowed to recover based upon intentional interfer-
ence with prospective economic advantage against a transact-
ing party, unless the defendant-interloper has thwarted the
broker's expectancy of receiving a commission through fraud-
ulent misrepresentation. 42 This will adequately protect bro-
39. See infra part MY.
40. See generally Cynthia A. Mertens & Jim Rowan, Brokers and Commis-
sions: Avoiding Surprises in Light of Chan v. Tsang, 15 REAL PRoP. L. REP.
(CEB) 165, 169-70 (May 1992). See also Gary A. Kreitzer, Intentional Interfer-
ence with Prospective Economic Relationships: A Case for Intentional Tort Re-
covery for the California Real Estate Broker, 15 U.S.F. L. REV. 205, 212-16
(1980-1981).
41. See infra part 1V.E.
42. See infra part V. This comment focuses strictly on situations where a
real estate broker brings an action based upon intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage against a transacting party (i.e. a buyer or
seller). Again, this is the precise scenario presented by the Buckaloo decision.
Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865, 866-67 (Cal. 1975), overruled by Della
Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995). In such in-
stances, the author offers an answer to the question posed by the Della Penna
majority: What type of wrongful conduct supports a cause of action based upon
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage? That answer:
fraudulent misrepresentation. See discussion infra part V. In short, this com-
ment proposes that a broker seeking recovery based upon intentional interfer-
ence with prospective economic advantage be required to demonstrate: (1) an
economic relationship between broker and vendor or broker and vendee con-
taining the probability of future economic benefit to the broker; (2) knowledge
by the defendant of the existence of the relationship; (3) fraudulent misrepre-
sentation on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4)
actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) damages to the plaintiff proxi-
mately caused by the acts of the defendant. See infra part V. As to the third
element, existing case law merely requires "intentional acts on the part of the
defendant designed to disrupt the relationship." Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 872.
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kers and harmonize the Buckaloo tort with the Phillippe
court's more recent treatment of the equitable estoppel
doctrine.4 3
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Real Estate Brokers' Statute of Frauds44
Twenty-four states require real estate brokers to obtain
written brokerage contracts.45 Most of these states, including
46California, prohibit brokers from recovering compensation
for services rendered pursuant to unwritten agreements. 47
The California Supreme Court, in 1987, characterized the
state's century-old real estate brokers' statute of frauds as "a
consumer protection statute, perhaps the state's first."48
Beyond the certainty afforded by other statute of frauds
legislation, this act furnishes additional protections.49 First,
it shields the public from the imposition of unwanted broker-
age relationships and resultant contractual liability.5 ° Sec-
ond, the statute reduces the unfounded and multiple claims
especially prevalent in the real estate service sector.51
43. See discussion infra part V.
44. The term "real estate brokers' statute of frauds" is commonly used in
New Jersey to describe that state's statutory requirement for documented
brokerage transactions. R.A. Intile Realty Co. v. Raho, 614 A.2d 167, 174 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992).
45. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.25.010(8) (1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101(7)
(1995); CAL. CrV. CODE § 1624(d) (West Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-325a(b) (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2714(a) (1993); IDAHO
CODE § 9-508 (1990); IND. CODE § 32-2-2-1 (Burns 1995); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 622.32 (West 1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371.010(8) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 566.132(e) (West Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 28-2-903(1)(e) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-107 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 645.320 (1993); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-9 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 47-1-45 (Michie 1995); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701(a)(10) (McKinney
1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1335.05 (Anderson 1995); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 41.580(1)(f) (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-4(6) (1985); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 26.01 (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, § 2252 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.36.010(5) (West Supp. 1995);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 240.10 (West Supp. 1995).
46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(d) (West 1995).
47. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101(7) (1995); IDAHO CODE § 9-508
(1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 645.320 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 41.580(1)(f) (1993);
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.36.010(5) (West Supp. 1995).
48. Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279, 1289 (Cal. 1987).
49. Id. at 1289-90.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1289 n.12.
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For most people, the purchase or sale of a residence is the
most important type of financial transaction they will ever
make. 52 In the commercial setting, the importance of real es-
tate transactions is of similar significance to the parties in-
volved.58 With so much at stake, the aims of the real estate
brokers' statute of frauds are especially beneficial. 4
1. A Shield Against Unwanted Brokerage
Relationships
The California Supreme Court has observed that Civil
Code section 1624, subdivision (d), serves a cautionary pur-
pose: By requiring brokers to obtain written authority to act
for compensation, the legislature reminds transacting parties
(i.e. sellers and buyers) of the serious legal obligation being
undertaken.55 Another court has aptly observed:
Real estate brokers are a necessary and beneficial part of
a business community. They succeed and benefit the com-
munity in proportion to their'industry, ingenuity, aggres-
siveness and persistence. However, the imposition of
their services upon unwilling recipients and attempts to
create contractual relationships and resultant liability for
commissions should be viewed with some degree of strict-
ness to prevent unwary members of the public from being
victimized by the aggressiveness of the brokers.56
In calling upon the Tennessee Legislature to enact a real es-
tate brokers' statute of frauds in that state, the court contin-
ued, "[a] real estate owner who orally expresses a mere will-
ingness to sell his property on certain terms does not obligate
himself to sell to the first buyer produced by a volunteer
broker."5
7
Transacting parties, at least those aware of the statute of
frauds, reasonably expect oral expressions to be nonbinding.58
And brokers are conclusively presumed to know that broker-
age fee agreements must be in writing to be enforceable. 59 It
52. Id. at 1289.
53. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1289.
54. Id. at 1290.
55. Id. at 1289-90.
56. Billington v. Crowder, 553 S.W.2d 590, 595 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).
57. Id.
58. W. David Slawson, The Futile Search for Principles for Default Rules, 3
S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 29, 37 (1993).
59. Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279, 1286 (Cal. 1987).
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is hardly surprising, therefore, that a general understanding
exists in the real estate service sector that discussions con-
cerning brokerage services are merely tentative until written
down and signed.6 °
2. Reduces Unfounded and Multiple Claims
The California Supreme Court has also observed that
section 1624(d) protects transacting parties from the asser-
tion of false claims by brokers.6 Because brokerage services
do not produce a tangible product, disputes often arise as to
the services the broker performed and their worth.62 To
make matters worse, the intangible, highly competitive na-
ture of brokerage services often results in two or more com-
peting brokers claiming a commission arising out of a single
transaction.63
3. Brokers Still Rely Upon Unwritten Brokerage
Agreements
Despite the important, salutary aims of section 1624(d)
and the conclusive presumption that brokers know its man-
date, 64 many brokers routinely rely upon unwritten promises
of compensation. 65 For example, brokers often agree to work
on a buyer's oral promise, "If you find me what I want, you'll
get your commission from the seller when the deal closes. "66
And brokers working for sellers also frequently rely on oral
promises, despite the unprofessional nature of such
conduct.67
60. See Slawson, supra note 58, at 37.
61. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1283, 1288; Pac. Southwest Dev. Corp. v. Western
Pac. R.R., 301 P.2d 825, 827-28 (Cal. 1956).
62. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1283, 1288; Pacific Southwest Dev. Corp., 301
P.2d at 827-28.
63. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1283, 1288; Pacific Southwest Dev. Corp., 301
P.2d at 827-28.
64. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1286.
65. See id. at 1290; see also Mertens & Rowan, supra note 40, at 166; AR-
THUR G. BOWMAN & W. DENNY MILLIGAN, REAL ESTATE LAW IN CALIFORNIA
§ 3.14 (7th ed. 1986).
66. See, e.g., Grant v. Halverson, 278 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Ct. App. 1991) (depub-
lished by No. S020873, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 3451 (July 25, 1991) (per curiam).
67. BOWMAN & MILLIGAN, supra note 65, § 3.14. The authors explain how
the use of oral listings may result in hard feelings among brokers. Id. They
write:
Assume a not too infrequent situation where broker A has an oral list-
ing. Broker A advertises the property for sale and broker B calls him.
1226 [Vol. 36
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In 1987, the California Supreme Court, aware that the
pervasive use of unwritten brokerage contracts creates a per-
sistent difficulty, began insisting upon strict application of
the real estate brokers' statute of frauds.68 By striking this
posture, the high court closed three decades of speculation
that it intended to abrogate the century-old statute.
B. Equitable Estoppel: The Development of a Doctrine
Which Threatened to Abrogate Civil Code Section
1624(d)
1. Monarcho v. Lo Greco: California's Leading Case
on Equitable Estoppel as a Bar Against the
Statute of Frauds
In Monarcho v. Lo Greco,69 a young man agreed to con-
tinue working on the family farm until his parents died.7 ° In
exchange, his mother and stepfather orally assured him that
he would receive the parents' property upon the last spouse's
death.71 Over the next fifteen years, the son devoted his life
to making the family venture a success.72 As a consequence,
he sacrificed any opportunity for further education or any
chance to accumulate property of his own.73
The stepfather died first.7 4 It was later discovered that
he had devised his share of the promised property to his
grandson.75 At the time, a statute of frauds provision (today
designated as California Civil Code section 1624, subdivision
(e))76 required that agreements which by their terms were in-
capable of being performed during the lifetime of the prom-
isor be reduced to writing.77 The California Supreme Court,
Not wanting B to realize that the listing is only an "oral open" listing,
A conceals this fact from B, but does agree to share the commission if B
sells the property. B diligently works on the listing believing, in good
faith, that a valid listing exists, only to find out later, after considera-
ble time, that his efforts were fruitless.
Id.
68. See Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279, 1290-91 (Cal. 1987).
69. 220 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1950).
70. Monarcho, 220 P.2d at 739.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Monarcho, 220 P.2d at 739.
76. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1624(e) (West Supp. 1996).
77. Monarcho, 220 P.2d at 739.
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in deciding Monarcho, observed that the controlling question
was whether the grandson was estopped from raising a sec-
tion 1624(e) defense. 7  The supreme court answered this
question affirmatively. 79
The Monarcho decision articulated two distinct tests that
allow a promisee to raise estoppel to bar a promisor's statute
of frauds defense. 0 One holds that equitable estoppel is ap-
propriate if the promisee has suffered an unconscionable in-
jury as a result of having seriously changed position in rea-
sonable reliance on the oral promise. 1 The other holds that
an estoppel defense is properly raised if enforcement of the
statute of frauds results in the unjust enrichment of the
promisor.8 2 In Monarcho, the plaintiff satisfied both tests.8 3
2. Extension of the Monarcho Decision Would Have
Abrogated the Real Estate Brokers' Statute of
Frauds
In the years following the Monarcho decision, it appeared
increasingly likely that the California Supreme Court would
soon allow brokers to raise equitable estoppel to bar opera-
tion of section 1624(d).84 The authors of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts have concluded that the availability of
this equitable remedy effectively abrogates the requirement
that brokers obtain written brokerage contracts.8 5 Neverthe-
78. Id.
79. Id. at 742.
80. Id. at 741.
81. Id.
82. Monarcho, 220 P.2d at 741.
83. Id. at 739.
84. See Frederick I. Fox, Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in
California, 53 CAL. L. REV. 590, 609 (1965). The author writes:
Why should the Statute be strictly applied in the case of contracts for
the employment of real estate agents and not in other instances?...
Such distinctions and limitations make little sense if the inarticulate
premise underlying the extension of the estoppel doctrine is that the
Statute no longer serves a useful purpose. The explanation for what
the courts have done must largely be based on speculation. The courts
have gone about as far as possible towards abrogating the Statute of
Frauds consistent with the presence of the Statute on the books.
Id.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 375 (1981). The authors write:
A, a home owner, makes an oral contract with B, a real estate broker,
to pay B the usual 5% commission if B succeeds in selling A's house.
The state Statute of Frauds contains a provision providing that a real
estate broker shall have no right to such a commission unless there is a
1228 [Vol. 36
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
less, for more than three decades the high court grappled
with the emerging equitable estoppel doctrine in the real es-
tate brokerage context.8 6
3. The California Supreme Court's Three Decades of
Indecision: 1956 to 1987
a. The Pacific Southwest Case
Six years after the Monarcho decision, in Pacific South-
west Development Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad, v the
supreme court narrowly upheld the dismissal of an action
brought by a broker to recover a commission, because the bro-
ker had failed to satisfy section 1624(d).88 The defendant had
employed the broker to obtain a certain purchase option and,
in consideration, the defendant had orally promised to pay
the broker a five percent commission if his efforts proved suc-
cessful.8 9 Relying upon this understanding, the broker initi-
ated negotiations but proved unable to secure the desired
option.90
Later, the defendant negotiated directly with the seller
and obtained the option.9' Despite the broker's inability to
procure an agreement, the defendant paid the broker a two
and one-half percent commission. 92 The unsatisfied broker
then sued, seeking recovery of the full five percent
commission. 93
written memorandum of the contract. B sells A's house for $ 100.000
and sues in restitution for $ 5,000, the reasonable value of B's services.
B cannot recover in restitution because the purpose of the Statute
would be frustrated if B were allowed to recover as restitution the
same amount that had been promised under the contract.
Id. at cmt. a, illus. 3. But see Clinkinbeard v. Poole, 266 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1954) (extending availability of equitable estoppel to real estate brokers'
statute of frauds just four years after Monarcho), overruled by Louisville Trust
Co. v. Monsky, 444 S.W.2d 120 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
86. See Brian M. Englund, Oral Employment Contracts and Equitable Es-
toppel: The Real Estate Broker as Victim, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1503 (1975). The
writer observed that "[tihe supreme court seems only to be waiting for the right
case and the proper pleadings to invoke an estoppel to assert [section 1624(d)]."
Id. at 1513-14.
87. 301 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1956).
88. Pacific Southwest Dev. Corp., 301 P.2d at 830-31.
89. Id. at 828.
90. Id. at 827-28.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Pacific Southwest Dev. Corp., 301 P.2d at 828.
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A narrow, four member majority of the supreme court
held that such facts established neither unconscionable in-
jury, nor quantum meruit.94 Therefore, equitable estoppel
did not arise.9 5 However, Justice Carter dissented. He ar-
gued that the broker had met Monarcho's unjust enrichment
test, writing: "Suppose plaintiff had devoted all of his time to
the project for five years, would there be any doubt that there
was both injury and unjust enrichment?"9 Justice Carter
disagreed with the majority's assessment that the broker's ef-
forts had not been a material benefit to the defendant.97
b. The Franklin Case
Later, in 1963, the California Supreme Court hinted that
equitable estoppel might prove an appropriate remedy for
brokers in many future cases involving section 1624(d).98
Franklin v. Hansen99 involved a typical oral listing contract
between a seller and his broker. 100 The broker had earlier
performed property management services for the seller on the
subject property, receiving his compensation pursuant to an
oral agreement. 101
The seller, upon deciding to sell this rental property, en-
gaged the broker as his agent.10 2 They entered into an oral
commission contract.103 The terms of this agreement were
that if the broker procured a purchaser willing to pay
$115,000, the seller promised to pay the broker a five percent
commission.1 0 4 In reliance upon that contract, the broker ob-
94. Id. at 830-31.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Englund, supra note 86, at 1513.
98. Franklin v. Hansen, 381 P.2d 386, 390 (Cal. 1963).
99. 381 P.2d 386 (Cal. 1963).
100. Franklin, 381 P.2d at 387.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
A broker will be regarded as the "procuring cause" of a sale, so as to be
entitled to a commission, if his or her efforts are the foundation on
which the negotiations resulting in a sale are begun. A cause originat-
ing a series of events which without a break in their continuity result
in accomplishment of prime objective [sic) of the employment of the
broker who is producing a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy real
estate on the owner's terms.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1208 (6th ed. 1990).
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tained several offers of less than $115,000.105 The seller re-
fused each, but orally agreed to reduce the $115,000 asking
price to $100,000.1°6
Subsequently, the broker obtained an offer of
$100,000.107 The broker telephoned the seller with the news,
requesting an authorization by telegram to sell the prop-
erty.108 As requested, the seller dispatched the following tel-
egram: "Los Angeles, California . . . D.V. Franklin, 208
Marine Balboa Island California. This is to confirm that I
will sell 608 South Bay Front Balboa Island for 100,000 cash
this offer good until noon 1-19-60. Chas. P. Hansen."10 9
On January 19, 1960, the broker advised the seller that
the property had been sold. 110 The owner, nevertheless, re-
fused to complete the transaction or pay the broker's
commission.111
The broker then sought to enforce the commission agree-
ment. 1 12 In response to the broker's action, the defendant de-
murred, raising section 1624(d).1 13 The trial court overruled
the demurrer, and a trial ensued.114 At its conclusion, the
broker received a judgment awarding the full commission of
$5000.115
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the judgment,
ruling that the telegram was insufficient to satisfy section
1624(d). 11 6 The majority seized the opportunity that Frank-
lin afforded to observe: "Plaintiff herein has neither alleged
nor urged the application of an equitable estoppel, pursuant
to which doctrine a party to an oral agreement might be es-
topped to rely on the statute of frauds in instances where the
elements of the doctrine can be established."117
105. Franklin, 381 P.2d at 387.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Franklin, 381 P.2d at 387.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Franklin, 381 P.2d at 387.
116. Id. at 390.
117. Id.
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c. The Tenzer Case
More than two decades passed before the supreme court
again addressed the equitable estoppel issue in the real es-
tate brokerage context.11 Then, in 1985, in Tenzer v. Super-
scope, Inc.,"-9 the supreme court pointed out that it had never
decided "whether brokers may invoke equitable remedies to
avoid the sometimes harsh results of the statute of frauds."12 °
The Tenzer court observed that the proponents of equita-
ble estoppel had long sought an examination of this issue due
to changes in the real estate market.' 2 1 In particular, the
supreme court noted Miller and Starr's contention that un-
like in 1878 (the year Civil Code section 1624(d) was en-
acted), modern brokers must negotiate with sophisticated
consumers who are often in superior bargaining positions. 1
22
In such situations, critics of the statute of frauds contended
that brokers must rely upon oral promises.'
23
The issue, however, was not squarely before the court be-
cause the plaintiff in that case was an unlicensed finder.1
24
Although the supreme court allowed the unlicensed finder to
raise equitable estoppel to defeat a section 1624(d) defense, it
expressly postponed consideration of the equitable estoppel
issue where the plaintiff is a broker.1 25 Until 1987, thirty-
seven years after Monarcho, the availability of equitable es-
toppel to defeat section 1624(d) remained a serious possibility
for brokers. 126
4. Phillippe v. Shapell Industries: Brokers' Presumed
Knowledge of Civil Code Section 1624(d)
Precludes Their Use of Equitable Estoppel
a. Legislative Developments on the Eve of the
Phillippe Decision
In Phillippe, the California Supreme Court observed the
special importance of real estate transactions to the parties
118. Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279, 1285 (Cal. 1987) (discussing
Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc., 702 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985)).
119. 702 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985).
120. Tenzer, 702 P.2d at 217 n.6.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 217-18.
125. Tenzer, 702 P.2d at 217-18.
126. Id. at 217 n.6.
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involved.1 27 In the years preceding Phillippe, the legislature
had enacted a considerable amount of legislation intended to
protect those engaging in real estate transactions. 128 In par-
ticular, the listing of real property through brokers had be-
come highly regulated.' 2 9
A broker using pre-printed listing agreements, for exam-
ple, must ensure that the forms contain the following state-
ment in not less than ten-point type and placed near the spec-
ification of the commission rate: "Notice: Both the amount or
rate of real estate commissions is not fixed by law. They are
set by each broker individually and may be negotiable between
the seller and broker."130 This act further mandates that the
rate or amount of commission be entered manually (i.e. it
may not appear as part of the printed form).13 1 Moreover,
every exclusive agency listing, exclusive right to sell listing,
and buyer-brokerage agreement must include a definite,
fixed, and final termination date.132
If the subject property is residential in nature and con-
sists of one to four units, there are two additional obligations
imposed upon the broker. 33 One requires the broker to con-
duct a "reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection
of the accessible areas of the property." 3 4 The other requires
brokers to provide a statutorily-worded, agency disclosure
statement to the prospective sellers prior to the execution of
the listing contract. 3 5 A broker who fails to promptly pro-
vide the agency disclosure may be refused enforcement of an
127. Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279, 1289-90 (Cal. 1987).
128. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079 (West Supp. 1996) (enacted 1985) (im-
posing duty to inspect residential real property on brokers); id. §§ 1102-1102.15
(enacted 1985) (requiring transfer disclosure statement in certain residential
real property sales); id. § 1675 (enacted 1978) (regulating liquidated damages
provisions in purchase and sale contracts for residential real property).
129. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10176(f) (West 1995) (mandating
that definite termination date be specified in all exclusive listings for which a
real estate license is required); id. § 10147.5 (establishing negotiability and no-
tice requirements for real estate commission contracts); CAL. Crv. CODE § 2374
(West 1995) (imposing duty on brokers in residential transactions to provide
parties with written agency disclosure) (enacted 1986) (repealed 1995 and con-
solidated in CAL. CIV. CODE § 2026 (West Supp. 1996)).
130. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10147.5 (West 1994).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 10176(f).
133. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2079-2079.5, 2374 (West Supp. 1996).
134. Id. §§ 2079-2079.5.
135. Id. § 2374 (repealed 1995 and consolidated in CAL. Cirv. CODE § 2026
(West Supp. 1996)).
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otherwise valid commission claim, despite having performed
that contract fully. 136
b. The Phillippe Decision: Sound Policy Reasons
Support the Denial of Equitable Estoppel
to Brokers
In 1987, the supreme court decided Phillippe v. Shapell
Industries, Inc.,'13  now the leading case in California on the
availability of equitable estoppel to bar a section 1624(d) de-
fense. 138 In Phillippe, the plaintiff-broker helped a corpora-
tion locate a tract of land suitable for residential develop-
ment.139 At the outset of the their relationship, the broker
and the corporation's director of land acquisition reached an
oral agreement. 40 The corporation would pay the broker a
commission upon its purchase of any land suggested by the
broker. 141 The corporation, itself a broker, also promised to
include the terms of this oral agreement in any written
purchase offer. 142
Four months later, during April 1973, the plaintiff lo-
cated and presented a seemingly suitable property to the cor-
poration. 143 As earlier promised, the corporation submitted a
written purchase offer which incorporated its promise to pay
the broker's entire commission once the transaction was com-
136. Huijers v. DeMarrais, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 232, 234-35 (Ct. App. 1992). Cal-
ifornia Civil Code § 2374.5(a) requires that "[tihe listing agent.., shall provide
the disclosure form to the seller prior to entering into the listing agreement."
CAL. CIv. CODE § 2374(a) (West 1995). In Huijers, the court of appeal denied a
broker his commission as a sanction. Huijers, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 238-39. This
common law remedy was fashioned to punish the broker for his failure to
promptly furnish the statutorily required agency disclosure form. Id. at 234-35.
The broker and seller had executed an exclusive right to sell listing before
the broker furnished the form. Id. at 238. The Huijers court believed that the
"full measure of protection that the Legislature intended to provide to the seller
cannot be achieved if the listing agent fails to provide the disclosure form prior
to entering into the listing agreement." Id. For that reason, the court of appeal
held that the broker could not enforce his otherwise enforceable compensation
claim. Id. at 234-35.
137. Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279 (Cal. 1987).
138. See, e.g., American Int'l Enters. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir.
1993) (applying California law); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373,
382 n.17 (Cal. 1988); Greenwood & Co. Real Estate v. C-D Inv. Co., 18 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 144, 148 (Ct. App. 1988).
139. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1280-81.
140. Id. at 1280.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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plete.14 4 However, the parties never completed the sale due
to a property defect. 14
5
Then, in August 1973, the broker located another prop-
erty.146 Over the next six months, the broker attempted to
interest the corporation in this ninety-four acre parcel.
147
This effort included meeting with its owner and repeatedly
providing the corporation with information.148  Approxi-
mately two years later, the corporation purchased sixty-three
acres of the original ninety-four acres without the plaintiff's
participation.
49
The plaintiff then filed an action seeking to enforce the
oral, buyer-brokerage contract against the corporation.15 0 At
trial, the plaintiff was allowed to assert equitable estoppel to
defeat the corporation's section 1624(d) defense.' 5 '
A trial ensued in which the jury, by special verdict, found
that the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the corporation's
purchase and awarded damages of slightly less than five per-
cent of the sales price. 152 On appeal, the corporation con-
tended that the trial court erred in estopping its statute of
frauds defense. 1 53
The supreme court agreed with the corporation, holding
that equitable estoppel was not available to defeat section
1624(d).15 4 The court observed that equitable estoppel may
arise only where the broker's reliance upon the oral promise
was reasonable.155 The Phillippe plaintiff, as a licensed bro-
ker, was conclusively presumed to know the requirement of
144. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1280.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1280-81.
148. Id. at 1280.
149. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1280.
150. Id. Buyer-brokerage contracts are more common in California than
ever before. Id. BowMAN & MILLIGAN, supra note 65, § 3.14. Under such an
agreement, the broker's compensation may be provided in a number of different
ways. Id. The buyer may pay the broker an hourly wage; or the sales price is
reduced by one-half the commission offered by the seller, and the buyer pays
the broker an equal amount; or the buyer's broker splits the commission offered
by the seller with the seller's broker. Id. See also Kuhl Corp. v. Sullivan, 17
Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 426-30 (Ct. App. 1993) (discussing the structure of a typical
buyer-brokerage agreement in the commercial context).
151. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1281.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1280.
155. Id. at 1286.
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section 1624(d). 156 Therefore, his reliance upon the corpora-
tion's promise to later reduce the commission agreement to
writing was not reasonable. 157
c. An Adequate Protection for Brokers: Equitable
Estoppel May Arise in Limited
Circumstances Involving Fraud
(1) The Phillippe Court Disapproves the
LeBlond Decision
The conclusion that a broker cannot reasonably rely
upon a transacting party's promise to later reduce a commis-
sion agreement to writing motivated the Phillippe court to re-
ject a published opinion issued nearly four decades earlier by
the California Court of Appeal in LeBlond v. Wolfe.'15 There,
the appellate court permitted a plaintiff-broker to estop the
defendant-buyer from raising section 1624(d); the buyer had
induced the broker to release the seller from a written obliga-
tion to pay a commission by orally assuring the broker that
he, the buyer, would pay.1 5 9 The Phillippe court observed
that in light of the a broker's presumed knowledge of section
1624(d), it is not reasonable for a broker to sacrifice a written
listing contract in reliance upon an oral promise. 160 Since
reasonable reliance is a necessary element of equitable estop-
pel, the supreme court disapproved LeBlond.16'
(2) The Phillippe Court Endorses the Owens
Decision
In contrast to its disapproval of the LeBlond decision, the
supreme court explicitly endorsed the court of appeal's 1980
ruling in Owens v. Foundation For Ocean Research.1 62 There,
the plaintiff-broker had orally agreed to act as agent for the
defendant-corporation in its sale of certain real property. 6 '
156. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1286.
157. Id. at 1287.
158. 188 P.2d 278 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948), overruled by Phillippe v. Shapell In-
dus., 743 P.2d 1279 (Cal. 1987).
159. LeBlond, 188 P.2d at 278-80. See also Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., 743
P.2d 1279, 1287 (Cal. 1987) (observing that LeBlond plaintiff alleged to have
canceled an enforceable contract).
160. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1287.
161. Id.
162. 165 Cal. Rptr. 571 (Ct. App. 1980).
163. Owens, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
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The corporation's lawyer falsely assured the broker that the
board of directors had reduced the brokerage contract to writ-
ing.64 Relying upon this statement, the broker procured the
eventual purchaser.165 Following the sale, the corporation re-
fused to pay the broker's agreed fee, and the broker discov-
ered that the brokerage contract remained unwritten.
166
The Owens court allowed the broker to estop the corpora-
tion's section 1624(d) defense.' 67 The court of appeal distin-
guished an assurance that an enforceable agreement was in
place from a promise to pay a commission.168 Because a bro-
ker may reasonably rely upon the former despite the broker's
presumed knowledge of the statute of frauds, the court held
the broker may bar the promisor from raising a section
1624(d) defense. 169
The Phillippe court confirmed the Owens outcome: a bro-
ker may estop a defendant's section 1624(d) defense under
such circumstances.170 Because reasonable reliance on such
a false promise remains actionable, the supreme court opined
that brokers are adequately protected against fraud commit-
ted by transacting parties.'1
7
C. Interference with Agreements Unenforceable Under Civil
Code Section 1624(d): A Tort That Emerged
Amidst Pre-Phillippe Uncertainty
1. General Principles
At common law, an individual who unjustifiably dis-
rupted the performance of a contract between others was lia-
ble in tort to the disappointed promisee.17 2 More than a cen-
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 573.
168. Owens, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
169. Id.
170. Philippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279, 1292 (Cal. 1987).
171. Id.
172. WILLiAM L. PROSSER, TORTS 949 (4th ed. 1971). California recognizes
two distinct forms of contractual interference: inducement to breach a contract
and interference with a contractual relationship. Shamblin v. Berge, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 313, 315-16 (Ct. App. 1985). The elements of inducement to breach a con-
tract are: (1) a valid and existing contract with a third party; (2) the defend-
ant's knowledge of the contract and an intent to induce its breach; (3) breach of
that contract by the third party; (4) causation of the breach by the defendant's
unjustified or wrongful contract; and (5) resulting damages. Id. The elements
of interference with a contractual relationship are: (1) a valid and existing con-
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tury ago, the Queen's Bench observed that the actionable
wrong stemmed from the interloper's inducement to sever the
parties' relationship.' 73 Thus, the interloper was potentially
liable even where the relationship had not been cemented by
an enforceable contract.1 74 In so deciding, the court laid the
foundation for the present day tort of intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage. 75
This tort is particularly helpful to a disappointed prom-
isee where the promise is unenforceable due to the statute of
frauds. 76 In such cases, the controlling question has often
been whether the statute of frauds should also bar the prom-
isee's tortious interference claim.'7 7 Most often, the courts
have refused attempts by interlopers to seek the shelter of a
statute of frauds provision, since such laws are intended to
protect contracting parties. 178  The New Jersey Supreme
Court stated the rationale for this refusal more than three
decades ago, in the following language: "[One] who unjustifi-
ably interferes with the contract of another is guilty of a
wrong. And since [persons] usually honor their promises no
matter what flaws a lawyer can find, the offender should not
tract with a third party; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract; (3) inten-
tional and unjustified acts committed by the defendant designed to interfere or
disrupt the contract; (4) actual interference or disruption of the contract; and (5)
resulting damages. Id.
173. PROSSER, supra note 172, at 949.
174. Id.
175. Id. The California Supreme Court has stated the elements of the tort in
the real estate brokerage context as:
(1) an economic relationship between broker and vendor or broker and
vendee containing the probability of future economic benefit to the bro-
ker, (2) knowledge by the defendant of the existence of the relation-
ship, (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to dis-
rupt the relationship, (4) actual disruption of the relationship, (5)
damages to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the
defendant.
Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865, 872 (Cal. 1975), overruled by Della Penna v.
Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
176. E.g., Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1975), overruled by Della
Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995); Keeley v.
Price, 103 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Ct. App. 1972); Friedman v. Jackson, 72 Cal. Rptr.
129 (Ct. App. 1968); Golden v. Anderson, 64 Cal. Rptr. 404 (Ct. App. 1967);
Zimmerman v. Bank of Am., 12 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1961).
177. See cases cited supra note 176.
178. See cases cited supra note 176.
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be heard to say the contract meddled with could not have
been enforced."179
On the other hand, many courts have refused to premise
liability upon an agreement that violates public policy. 180
One California court, for example, has applied this policy con-
cern to a case involving tortious interference specifically in
the context of a real estate broker's commission contract. 81
In Renaissance Realty, Inc. v. Soriano,18 2 the plaintiff-broker
had assisted the Sorianos in their search for a new home.
1 8 3
While the Sorianos' search was on-going, the broker entered
into an agreement, commonly known as a net listing,8 4 with
the seller.18 5
The seller and the broker agreed that if the broker sold
the property to the Sorianos for $73,000, the broker would
earn a $5000 brokerage fee.1 86 The seller insisted, however,
that he receive $67,000 on the transaction, even if the prop-
179. Harris v. Perl, 197 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1964). In Harris, the owner had
signed a written listing contract in favor of the broker. Id. at 361. In reliance
upon this agreement, the broker procured the eventual purchaser of the prop-
erty. Id.
While this written commission agreement was in effect, the owner trans-
ferred his title to a creditor in partial satisfaction of a debt. Id. Initially,
neither the broker nor the buyer knew of this transfer. Id. The creditor then
informed the buyer of this ownership change, but not the broker. Id. The buyer
then purchased the property directly from the creditor without the broker's par-
ticipation. Id.
The broker had no contract with the creditor, who was the actual seller of
the property. Id. The buyer, nevertheless, fraudulently informed the creditor
that no broker was entitled to be paid a real estate commission on the sale. Id.
at 362. The Harris court opined that absent the buyer's conduct, the creditor
would have recognized the broker as the procuring cause of the buyer's
purchase and paid a commission to her. Id. at 364. On this basis, the New
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment against the buyer.
Id.
180. E.g., Tanenbaum v. Sylvan Builders, Inc., 148 A.2d 176 (N.J. 1959) (de-
nying enforcement of a real estate commission agreement by unlicensed per-
son); Jolma v. Steinbock, 595 P.2d 980 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (denying enforce-
ment of real estate commission agreement by unlicensed person).
181. Renaissance Realty, Inc. v. Soriano, 174 Cal. Rptr. 837 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1981).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 838-39.
184. "A net listing is an arrangement in which the seller sets a minimum
price he or she will take for the property and the agent's commission is the
amount the property sells for over that minimum selling price." BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 932 (6th ed. 1990).
185. Renaissance Realty, Inc., 174 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
186. Id.
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erty sold for less than $73,000.18? Hoping that the Sorianos
would purchase the house for $73,000, the plaintiff ac-
cepted. ' The plaintiff failed to disclose this arrangement to
the Sorianos.' 18 9
The Sorianos purchased the property for $73,000, but
their first attempt to obtain financing failed due to an unsat-
isfactory appraisal.190 At that time, Tambaoan, a relative of
the Sorianos, induced the Sorianos to withdraw from the
transaction.' 9 ' In turn, the Sorianos misrepresented to the
plaintiff that they no longer wished to purchase the house. 192
Shortly after the parties canceled their escrow, Tambaoan
purchased the home and immediately conveyed it to the Sori-
anos for $67,000.193
The plaintiff brought an action against Tambaoan, as-
serting interference with a contractual relationship.'94 The
court, however, noted that the plaintiff's failure to disclose
the net listing to the Sorianos constituted a breach of the
plaintiff's fiduciary duty. 95 For that reason, the court re-
fused to award damages against Tambaoan, holding that a
fraudulently procured listing agreement is not properly the
subject of a tortious interference claim.'9 '
2. California's Earliest Case: Sweeley v. Gordon
Nearly a decade before Monarcho created uncertainty
over the vitality of section 1624(d), the California Court of
Appeal decided its first intentional interference with prospec-
tive economic advantage case. 197 In Sweeley v. Gordon,'98 a
broker performed the marketing of the seller's apartment
building in reliance upon an oral listing contract. 199 While so
engaged, the broker procured the eventual buyer of the prop-
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Renaissance Realty, Inc., 174 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
191. Id. at 839.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 838.
195. Renaissance Realty, Inc., 174 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
196. Id. at 839-40.
197. Sweeley v. Gordon, 118 P.2d 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 14.
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erty.200 Rather than presenting his offer through the broker,
the buyer dealt directly with the seller.20 1 Together the par-
ties completed the transaction without the broker's further
participation.2 °2
The broker claimed the seller had breached the oral list-
ing contract by refusing to pay his commission.2 °3 As a re-
sult, the broker instituted an action that named both seller
and buyer as defendants.20 4 This complaint charged the
buyer with a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of the com-
mission that he purportedly earned by procuring the sale.20 5
In resolving Sweeley, the California Court of Appeal
ruled that section 1624(d) afforded the seller the legal right to
sell to the buyer without paying a commission.20 6 The broker
had not alleged any otherwise unlawful conduct, such as
fraud.20 7 Noting that for a conspiracy to be actionable the
conspirator must have engaged in unlawful means, the court
upheld the sustaining of the buyer's demurrer.20 6
On petition for rehearing, the broker maintained "that
[the buyer] wrongfully induced [the seller] to violate his con-
tract with [the broker] and to assert the invalidity of the con-
tract because of the failure to comply with the statute of
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Sweeley, 118 P.2d at 14.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Sweeley, 118 P.2d at 14. Accord Colburn v. Session, 209 P.2d 989
(Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (following Sweeley on same relevant facts).
208. Sweeley, 118 P.2d at 16. This is strikingly similar to the approach
taken recently by the California Supreme Court in Della Penna v. Toyota Motor
Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995). See supra text accompanying notes
17-27. There, the high court set forth the elements of the tort of intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage as follows:
(1) an economic relationship between broker and vendor or broker and
vendee containing the probability of future economic benefit to the bro-
ker; (2) knowledge by the defendant of the existence of the relation-
ship; (3) wrongful acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt
the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) dam-
ages to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.
See Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 743 n.1 & 751
n.5. (Cal. 1995) (emphasis added).
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frauds."20 9 The court again ruled that merely inducing the
seller to stand upon his legal rights was not actionable.21 0
3. The Sweeley Decision Erodes Amidst the
Uncertainty Created by Monarcho, Pacific
Southwest, and Franklin
a. The Zimmerman Decision: Tortious
Interference Recovery Allowed Against a
Non-Transacting, Third Party
In Zimmerman v. Bank of America,21 a broker sought to
recover tort damages for a commission lost due to the inter-
ference of an institutional lender.212 The lender's employee
had arranged a meeting between the parties to a real estate
exchange.21 3 Prior to the meeting, the parties had been unac-
quainted with one another.21 4 The employee's purpose in ar-
ranging the meeting was to induce the parties to breach their
oral fee agreement with the broker.21 The broker had pro-
cured the exchange while relying exclusively upon the par-
ties' oral promise of compensation.21 6 The bank employee,
seemingly aware of the real estate brokers' statute of frauds,
suggested that the parties "save money" by reducing the bro-
ker's fee roughly sixty-six percent.21 7 The parties adopted
the suggestion.218
Barred by Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (d) from
recovering against the exchangers on their promise, the bro-
ker sought to recover against the bank based upon inten-
tional interference with prospective economic advantage.2 19
In response, the bank sought to assert section 1624(d) to bar
the broker's claim.220 The Zimmerman court, however, re-
jected the bank's proposed use of this defense, observing that
the status of an institutional lender "fundamentally differs"
209. Sweeley v. Gordon, 118 P.2d 842, 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941) (denying re-
hearing in a separately published decision).
210. Id.
211. 12 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1961).
212. Zimmerman, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Zimmerman, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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from that of either a buyer or seller of real property.2 2'
Therefore, the court held that the bank was not sheltered by
the "umbrella of the statute."2 22
By way of dicta, the unanimous court of appeal panel
contemplated the potential application of its holding to a case
involving a transacting party, specifically a buyer.223 Justice
Tobriner, a court of appeal judge in 1961, asked whether a
buyer may raise the Civil Code section 1624(d) defense where
the buyer - rather than a bank - had tortiously interfered
with an unenforceable listing contract.224 In such a case, "[iut
might be contended that ... the buyer ... stands in the same
financial position as the seller."225
Stated differently, as a result of the buyer inducing the
seller to assert section 1624(d), the seller incurs less expense
and the buyer may purchase the property at a reduced
226 2price. 6 This allegedly occurred in Sweeley.22 7 The Zimmer-
man court implied that a buyer, as a transacting party, was
potentially entitled to the protection afforded by section
1624(d), but held that a bank, not a transacting party, was
unprotected.228
b. The Golden Decision
During the decade following Zimmerman, the court of ap-
peal heard several cases that further illuminated the proper
221. Id. at 323.
222. Zimmerman, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
223. Id. at 322-23.
224. Id.
225. Id. ,at 323. Transacting parties (i.e. sellers and buyers) stand in the
same financial position with respect to the payment of any resultant brokerage
fee. Id. This is aptly illustrated by the Sweeley fact pattern. Sweeley v.
Gordon, 118 P.2d 14, 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941). There, the broker received the
seller's oral authorization to sell an apartment house for $68,500, in which case
the seller promised to pay a $3425 brokerage fee. Id. In reliance upon this
unenforceable promise, the broker procured a purchaser. Id. This purchaser
and the seller then agreed that the broker would not be paid and that the price
would be reduced to $66,000. Id. In other words, by avoiding the payment of
the brokerage expense, the seller saved $925 ($68,500 minus $3425 equals
$65,075; $65,075 is $925 less than the $66,000 which the seller actually re-
ceived). The buyer, on the other hand, saved $2500 (purchasing the apartment
house for $66,000, rather than $68,500). In this way, the transacting parties
transferred the broker's commission of $3425 to themselves (seller's $925 plus
purchaser's $2500 equals $3425).
226. Zimmerman v. Bank of Am., 12 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322-23 (Ct. App. 1961).
227. Sweeley v. Gordon, 118 P.2d 14, 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).
228. Zimmerman, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23.
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balance between section 1624(d) and brokers' claims of tor-
tious interference.229 In Golden v. Anderson,23 ° the plaintiff-
broker charged the buyer with having tortiously interfered
with an oral listing agreement between the plaintiff and the
seller.23' The fact pattern that first arose in Sweeley again
faced the court.232 In Golden, however, the buyer deceived
the seller; the seller was purposefully misled into believing
that no broker had procured the buyer's purchase. 233
The corporate buyer in Golden purchased the orally
listed property through the use of a straw person, who in-
sisted that the plaintiff-broker was not involved.234 Several
months after the transaction closed, the seller discovered the
deception.235
The seller notified the plaintiff, who then demanded that
the buyer pay him a commission.2 6 The Golden court held
that the buyer, as a malicious interloper, could not rely upon
the statute of frauds to bar the broker's intentional interfer-
ence with prospective economic advantage claim.23 7 Unlike
Sweeley, however, the buyer (i.e. a transacting party-defend-
ant) had engaged in fraudulent conduct in order to defeat the
broker's commission expectancy.2 8
c. The Friedman Decision
Less than a year after its decision in Golden, the court of
appeal faced similar facts in Friedman v. Jackson.239 There,
the plaintiff-broker and the sellers had an oral, open listing
agreement.240 The broker presented the property to the de-
229. See, e.g., Keeley v. Price, 103 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Ct. App. 1972); Friedman
v. Jackson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 129 (Ct. App. 1968); Golden v. Anderson, 64 Cal. Rptr.
404 (Ct. App. 1967).
230. 64 Cal. Rptr. 404 (Ct. App. 1967).
231. Golden, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 405-07.
232. Sweeley v. Gordon, 118 P.2d 14, 14 (Ct. App. 1941).
233. Golden, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07.
234. Id. at 407.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 407-08.
238. See Golden, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
239. 72 Cal. Rptr. 129, 129-30 (Ct. App. 1968).
240. Friedman, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 129. "An open listing obligates a seller to
pay a commission when a specified broker makes a sale, but which reserves the
right of the seller to sell his own property without paying a commission. Such
listings may be given to any number of brokers on the same property." BLAcK's
LAW DICTIONARY 932 (6th ed. 1990).
1244 [Vol. 36
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
fendant-buyers, who responded that the property was "too
much money. "241 A short time later, the buyers purchased
the property directly from the seller, without the broker's
participation.2 42 As in Golden, the buyers misled the seller;
here, instead of using a straw person, the buyers represented
that a friend, not a broker, had brought the property to their
attention.2 43 Applying both Zimmerman and Golden, the
court of appeal refused the defendant's attempted invocation
of the statute of frauds.244
Unlike Golden, the Friedman court elaborated upon the
importance of the defendant's conduct in determining
whether a cause of action for intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage will lie.245 In Friedman,
Judge Herndon recognized that the Sweeley court had re-
fused to hold a buyer liable for merely inducing the seller's
breach.246 However, he found Sweeley distinguishable be-
cause there had been no allegation that the buyer in Sweeley
had acted fraudulently.2 47 With this in mind, the Friedman
court wrote that even if the defendant could have achieved
the same result lawfully, a fraudulent misrepresentation sup-
ports a tortious interference claim.2 48 As in Golden, the
Friedman buyer (i.e. a transacting party-defendant) had en-
gaged in fraudulent conduct in order to defeat the broker's
commission expectancy.249
4. The California Supreme Court's Buckaloo Decision:
Tortious Interference Without a Hint of
Misrepresentation
In Buckaloo v. Johnson,25 ° the owner of an undeveloped
parcel on the Mendocino coast, known as Dark Gulch, erected
241. Friedman, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 129-30.
242. Id. at 130.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 131-32.
245. Id.
246. Friedman, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 131; Sweeley v. Gordon, 118 P.2d 842, 842
(Cal. Ct. App. 1941).
247. Friedman, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. 537 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1975), overruled by Della Penna v. Toyota Motor
Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
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a sign on her property which read: "For Sale - Contact Your
Local Broker."2 51
On May 3, 1972, the eventual purchaser of the property,
Virginia Arness, accompanied by her daughter and a real es-
tate salesperson, entered the plaintiff-broker's office.252 The
salesperson, who was employed by a competing broker, asked
if the plaintiff "cooperated with other brokers."253 The plain-
tiff indicated that he did.25 4
Following a general discussion of coastal investment
property, Arness asked about "the property with the sign,"
meaning Dark Gulch.255 The plaintiff knew Dark Gulch
well.256 Years earlier, he had possessed an exclusive right to
sell listing on this parcel.257 In response to Arness' question,
the plaintiff was able to provide detailed information regard-
ing its assets and liabilities.258
Later, the plaintiff notified the owner of Dark Gulch that
should Arness purchase the property, he intended to claim a
commission. 259 The plaintiff asserted that he would be the
procuring cause of a sale to Arness, as a result of their con-
versation.26 0 For this reason, the plaintiff requested that the
owner refer Arness to him should she contact the owner.261
251. Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 866-67.
252. Id. at 867.
253. Id. According to the California Department of Real Estate, "[miost list-
ing agreements now in common use authorize the listing broker to delegate
much of the work of procuring a buyer to cooperating brokers." CAL. DEP'T OF
REAL ESTATE, REFERENCE BOOK 205 (1990).
The salesperson in Buckaloo seems to have been interested in learning
whether the broker normally extended an offer of sub-agency to other brokers.
The plaintiff-broker in Buckaloo had earlier entered into an exclusive-authori-
zation-to-sell listing contract with Dark Gulch's owner, which had expired in
1968. Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 866-67. Under such an agreement, the broker pos-
sessed "the sole right to sell the property during a time period." BLAC's LAW
DICTIONARY 932 (6th ed. 1990). This means that even if another broker or the
owner finds a buyer, the agent will get a commission. Under such an arrange-
ment, a "cooperating broker" is a listing broker who agrees to split the specified
commission with another broker (i.e. the selling broker) who is the procuring
cause of the buyer's purchase. See generally CAL. DE'T OF REAL ESTATE, REFER-
ENCE BOOK 220 (1990).
254. Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 867.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 866-67.
258. Id. at 867.
259. Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 867.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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Weeks later, after learning that Arness had purchased
Dark Gulch without his participation, the plaintiff demanded
that the owner pay him a commission.262 The owner re-
fused.2 63 The plaintiff then brought an action against the
owner, Arness, the salesperson, and the salesperson's bro-
ker.264 The plaintiff maintained that the sign placed upon
the property ("For Sale - Contact Your Local Broker") con-
stituted an open listing with nearby brokers.265 However, the
broker did not allege compliance with Civil Code section
1624, subdivision (d).266 Notwithstanding this bar against di-
rect recovery on the implied listing contract, the plaintiff
sought to recover against Arness, the buyer, based upon in-
tentional interference with prospective economic
advantage.26 7
The controlling question in Buckaloo was whether a
buyer, who otherwise has acted lawfully, may raise the stat-
ute of frauds against a broker's intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage claim. 268 This is the same
question that the Sweeley court had answered affirmatively
thirty-four years before.269 Without expressly distinguishing,
criticizing, or disapproving the Sweeley decision, the supreme
court opted to answer the question in the negative.2
III. THE LEGAL PROBLEM
Two decades ago, the California Supreme Court decided
Buckaloo v. Johnson,271 a landmark intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage case.272 This case was
the first high court case to consider the tort of intentional in-
terference with prospective advantage in the real estate bro-
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 867.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 868.
267. Id.
268. See id. at 867.
269. Sweeley v. Gordon, 118 P.2d 842, 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).
270. See Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865, 868-74 (Cal. 1975), overruled by
Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995). The
Sweeley outcome was recently resurrected by the California Supreme Court in
Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995). See
supra note 208.
271. 537 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1975), overruled by Della Penna v. Toyota Motor
Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
272. Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 865.
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kerage context. The elements of the cause of action recog-
nized by the Buckaloo court remained good law despite two
decades of change in the real estate service sector until the
California Supreme Court issued its Della Penna decision in
October of 1995.273
The dispute in Buckaloo arose out of a completed real es-
tate sales transaction.1 4 William Buckaloo, the plaintiff-real
estate broker, brought an action against the buyer, alleging
that the buyer had prevented him from earning the conunis-
sion promised him by the seller.2  The buyer had allegedly
circumvented Buckaloo's efforts: Following a discussion con-
cerning the merits of the seller's property with Buckaloo at
his real estate office, the buyer purchased the land without
Buckaloo's further participation. 7 6 When Buckaloo later de-
manded a commission from the seller, the seller refused. 77
The supreme court's task was complicated, however, by
Buckaloo's failure to obtain the seller's signed authoriza-
tion. 7 1 Without a signed agreement, Buckaloo had no claim
against the seller for breach of contract, because absent a
writing such agreements are invalid under Civil Code section
1624, subdivision(d) 9
Despite Buckaloo's lack of recourse against the seller, a
unanimous court permitted Buckaloo to proceed against the
buyer based upon intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage. 280 The cause of action serves a valuable
role in California's economy by protecting brokers from un-
reasonable interference. 281' Because brokers' efforts generally
reduce the economic costs associated with buying and selling
real property, the Buckaloo tort indirectly facilitates efficient
real estate transactions. 28 2
By immunizing brokers against interference, however,
the author believes that the supreme court painted with too
broad a brush: It failed to distinguish between situations in
273. See supra note 175.
274. Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 866.
275. Id. at 866-67.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 867.
278. Id. at 868.
279. Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 868.
280. Id. at 873.
281. Perlman, supra note 28, at 124.
282. Id.
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which a transacting party (i.e. a seller or buyer) acts forth-
rightly throughout the entire transaction, from those situa-
tions in which one transacting party deceives the other (e.g.,
making a fraudulent claim that no brokers are involved).283
Consider the two following fact patterns which emphasize the
ambiguity of the Buckaloo opinion.
In Buckaloo, the buyer might have concealed the plain-
tiff-broker's involvement from the seller by fraudulently in-
forming the seller that no broker had been involved in the
buyer's decision to purchase the land.28 4 Having convinced
the seller of this falsehood, the buyer purchased the property
at a price substantially less than the seller would have other-
wise accepted. 28 5 The seller, by avoiding this brokerage ex-
pense, obtains the same net amount from the sale, despite
accepting a lower purchase price.28 6
Under this scenario, the author agrees with the Buckaloo
outcome. It is unfair to expect the seller, after having been
defrauded by the buyer, to pay Buckaloo's commission. It is
not unfair, however, to disgorge this ill-gotten gain from the
283. See Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 872. Specifically addressing the irrelevancy
of the buyer's honest conduct, Justice Mosk wrote:
Thus the cases are clear that a prospective purchaser may not induce a
seller bound under an oral agreement to breach that agreement and
sell to him at a price which necessarily excludes the broker. Where
fraud is involved, as in Golden, the actionable wrong stands out in bold
relief Less obvious perhaps, but nonetheless actionable, are the cir-
cumstances in which the purchaser, with full knowledge of the eco-
nomic relationship between broker and seller, intentionally induces
the latter to violate the terms of the relationship and seek refuge in the
unenforceability of the contract.
Id.
The California Supreme Court, on October 12, 1995, issued its opinion in
Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995). See
supra text accompanying notes 17-27. There, the California Supreme Court
recognized that the phrase "intentional acts" was too broad. Della Penna, 902
P.2d at 951. Instead, the high court endorsed the mildly narrower phrase
"wrongful acts." Id. The court expressly reserved refinements to the word
"wrongful" for later consideration. Id. at 741. Under the Buckaloo fact pattern,
the author believes the proper showing is one of "fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion." See discussion infra part V.
284. See Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 866-67; see also Friedman v. Jackson, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 130 (Ct. App. 1968) ("defendants were able to induce the 'owners' to
sell the property directly to defendants at a price which ... did not include
plaintiff's agreed commission"); Golden v. Anderson, 64 Cal. Rptr. 404, 406 (Ct.
App. 1967) (sale to straw person negotiated "on the basis ... no broker's com-
mission would be payable").
285. See Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 866-67.
286. See id.
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buyer, who now possess the economic benefit promised by the
seller to the broker. Therefore, the Buckaloo decision prop-
erly holds the buyer liable in tort for the full amount of the
commission.28 7
The difficulty with the Buckaloo opinion arises under a
different set of facts. The factual basis of the Buckaloo opin-
ion might have been as follows: The buyer may have learned
from the seller that the brokerage contract was unwritten.
Aware of the real estate brokers' statute of frauds, the buyer
merely informed the seller that unwritten brokerage agree-
ments are invalid.28 8 So apprised, the seller may have sold to
the buyer at a reduced price and refused to pay the broker's
commission.28 9
This is precisely the scenario alleged by the broker in
Sweeley v. Gordon.29 ° Under Buckaloo, the buyer is held lia-
ble in tort; this time, however, for merely advising the seller
that brokerage contracts must be in writing.291 This latter
outcome allows brokers who are guilty of violating section
1624(d) to recover against other transacting parties.29 2 Be-
cause transacting parties stand in the same financial position
with respect to the payment of brokerage expenses, 293 this
outcome allows brokers to circumvent the need for signed
brokerage contracts. 4 An updated approach to the tort of
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
in the real estate brokerage context is needed; one that
287. See infra part 1V.C.
288. See Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 866-67. A seller under such circumstances
may feel that she has been twice cheated by her broker. First, the broker de-
prived her of the cautionary effect provided through compliance with the real
estate brokers' statute of frauds. See supra part II.A.1. Second, the broker ob-
tained her agreement to pay a commission without providing her with the fol-
lowing statutorily-worded disclaimer: "Notice: Both the amount or rate of real
estate commissions is not fixed by law. They are set by each broker individually
and may be negotiable between the seller and broker." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 10147.5 (West 1995).
289. See Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 866-67.
290. 118 P.2d 14, 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941). See supra text accompanying note
210.
291. See infra part 1V.D.
292. See Mertens & Rowan, supra note 40, at 115-16.
293. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
294. See supra part II.A.1-2 (setting forth the "sound policy reasons" sup-
porting Civil Code § 1624(d) as articulated by the California Supreme Court).
See also Grant v. Halverson, 278 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Ct. App. 1991) depublished by
No. S020873, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 3451 (July 25, 1991) (per curiam).
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shields brokers from unjustified interference without eviscer-
ating the real estate brokers' statute of frauds.295
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Phillippe and Buckaloo: Inconsistent Application of
Civil Code Section 1624(d)
In the past two decades, an inconsistency has emerged in
the application of Civil Code section 1624, subdivision (d) by
the California Supreme Court. In Phillippe v. Shapell Indus-
tries, Inc.,296 the high court recognized the statute's "sound
policy considerations" and ruled that a broker may not raise
equitable estoppel to bar a transacting party (i.e. seller or
buyer) from asserting a Civil Code section 1624(d) defense
against a broker's contractual claim.297 This rule is subject to
a single, narrow exception: Estoppel is permitted only if the
broker, charged with knowledge of the relevant law, demon-
strates reasonable reliance upon a misrepresentation made
by the defendant.2 98
In contrast to the Phillippe court's insistence on compli-
ance with section 1624(d), the supreme court attaches little
significance to a broker's disregard of section 1624(d) where
the broker's action is based upon intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage.299 In Buckaloo v.
Johnson,3°° the high court held a transacting party liable in
tort, perhaps for nothing more than persuading another
transacting party to stand upon the legal rights that section
295. See infra part V. Professor Perlman has made a similar observation
regarding the relationship between tortious interference and the real estate
brokers' statute of frauds. Perlman, supra note 28, at 124. He writes:
Many jurisdictions require brokerage contracts to be in writing to re-
duce fraudulent claims for commissions. This in turn creates incen-
tives for the broker to find alternative means of recovery, such as suing
the buyer or seller or both for interference with his expectancy of a
commission. Courts thus must craft rules that both prevent fraudu-
lent claims by brokers and prevent buyers or sellers from unjustly ap-
propriating brokers' efforts. A general tort of interference with eco-
nomic expectancy, though available and used for this purpose, seems
too blunt an instrument.
Id.
296. 743 P.2d 1279 (Cal. 1987).
297. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 288-90.
298. Id. at 291-92.
299. See infra IV.A.2.
300. 537 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1975), overruled by Della Penna v. Toyota Motor
Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
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1624(d) afforded her.3 0 1 The contradiction created by the
Phillippe and Buckaloo decisions is best demonstrated
through the following illustrations.
1. Two Illustrative Examples
a. Illustration A
302
A seller is willing to sell her residence for $100,000. A
broker agrees to perform the marketing of the home. The
terms of their understanding are that if the broker procures a
purchaser who is willing and able to pay a purchase price of
$100,000, the seller will pay the broker $6000. The broker
complies with section 1624(d), insisting that the seller sign a
written contract incorporating these terms. The seller does
SO.
In reliance on the seller's promise, the broker shows the
home to prospective purchasers. The seller is present when
the broker and the eventual buyer make their inspection.
Both transacting parties are aware of section 1624(d) and the
written nature of the brokerage contract.
In the presence of the seller and broker, the buyer sug-
gests that the sales price be reduced to $94,000. In exchange,
the buyer orally promises to pay the broker $6000 if the bro-
ker will release the seller from any obligation to pay a com-
mission. The seller and broker agree to these terms, unaware
that the buyer intends to later refuse to pay the broker. The
parties complete the transaction, but the broker is never
paid.
b. Illustration B30 3
A seller is willing to sell his residence for $100,000. A
broker agrees to perform the marketing of the home. The
terms of their understanding are that if the broker procures a
purchaser who is willing and able to pay a purchase price of
$100,000, the seller will pay the broker $6000. The broker
fails to comply with section 1624(d), allowing this under-
standing to remain unwritten.
301. See infra IV.A.2.
302. Illustration A is based upon LeBlond v. Wolfe, 188 P.2d 278 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1948), overruled by Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279 (Cal. 1987).
303. Illustration B is based upon Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865 (Cal.
1975), overruled by Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740
(Cal. 1995), and on Sweeley v. Gordon, 118 P.2d 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).
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In reliance on the seller's promise, the broker shows the
home to prospective purchasers. The seller is present when
the broker and the eventual buyer make their inspection.
The buyer, but not the seller, is aware of section 1624(d).
Both know that the listing contract between the seller and
the broker is unwritten.
In the presence of the broker, the buyer informs the
seller that section 1624(d) renders unwritten brokerage con-
tracts invalid. The buyer observes that if the sales price is
reduced to $97,000 and the broker is not paid, then both
seller and buyer will be $3000 ahead. The seller adopts this
suggestion. The parties complete the transaction, and the
seller, asserting section 1624(d), refuses to pay the broker.
2. The Phillippe/Buckaloo Inconsistency
In Illustration A, the buyer may assert section 1624(d) to
defeat the broker's enforcement of the oral contract. 30 4 In re-
sponse, the broker might hope to raise equitable estoppel.3 °5
Having seriously changed position upon the buyer's oral
promise, the broker argues, it would be an injustice to allow
the buyer to rely upon section 1624(d).3 °6
For almost four decades, the California Court of Appeal
accepted the broker's equitable estoppel argument.30 7 In
1987, however, the California Supreme Court rejected this
outcome.30 8 In so ruling, the high court explained that an es-
sential element of equitable estoppel is reasonable reliance
upon the promise.3 0 9 As a state licensee, the broker is conclu-
sively presumed to know that brokerage fee agreements must
be in writing to be valid.3 10 Therefore, the supreme court
ruled that the broker acts unreasonably in releasing the
seller from an enforceable obligation in reliance upon the
buyer's oral promise.3 11 Thus, in Illustration A, after Phil-
lippe, a statute of frauds defense will bar an action by the
broker to recover the lost commission. 12
304. Philippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Cal. 1987).
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. Id. at 1288-89.
309. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1286.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1287.
312. See id.
1996] 1253
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The Phillippe court further explained that "sound policy
reasons" support this outcome.313 One, brokers are ade-
quately protected by the educational prerequisites to ob-
taining a state license.3 14 Two, this outcome effectuates the
legislature's growing desire to have documented transactions
as a means of protecting the public.31 5 Three, brokers are
further encouraged to obtain written brokerage contracts.
Written brokerage contracts are beneficial because they cau-
tion those dealing with real estate brokers and also reduce
the fraudulent and multiple claims that are especially com-
mon in the real estate service sector.3 1 6
In Illustration A, however, the broker initially complied
with the statute of frauds. The broker obtained a written
contract, but later released the seller in reliance upon an oral
assurance of compensation made by the buyer. While the
supreme court's refusal to recognize an estoppel on such facts
may seem unduly harsh toward brokers, it is consistent with
the court's policy-based discussion. However, this outcome
cannot be reconciled with the supreme court's allowance of a
full recovery based upon Illustration B.3 17
In Illustration B, the broker never obtained a writing in
spite of the conclusive presumption that the broker knew a
writing was legally required .3 1  From the outset, the broker
in Illustration B voluntarily assumed the risk that the seller
would refuse to pay the orally promised commission. 31 9
Moreover, unlike in Illustration A, the buyer was inno-
cent of misrepresentation. The buyer merely provided the
seller with truthful information affecting the transacting par-
ties' mutual interest. The seller remained free to disregard
the buyer's suggestion and compensate the broker or to re-
fuse to do so, instead standing upon the legal right afforded
by Phillippe and section 1624(d).
Although in Illustration A the broker recovers nothing,
in Illustration B the broker is entitled to recover the entire
$6000 commission from the buyer based upon intentional in-
313. Id. at 1288.
314. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1290.
315. Id. at 1289-90.
316. Id. See also infra part II.A.1-2.
317. Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1975), overruled by Della
Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
318. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1288-91.
319. See id. at 1286-87.
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terference with prospective economic advantage. 320 In both
illustrations, however, the statute of frauds bars recovery
against the seller.A'
B. The Buckaloo Decision Reflects Contemporaneous
Uncertainty Over the Vitality of Civil Code Section
1624(d)
In 1975, criticism of section 1624(d) was pervasive. 22
Just two months before the Buckaloo court issued its deci-
sion, one commentator lamented the plight of real estate bro-
kers as "victims" engaged in "the only occupation [in Califor-
nia] where contracts of employment are specifically required
by the statute of frauds."323
In the same year, Miller and Starr pointed out that bro-
kers often dealt with sophisticated principals who possessed
superior bargaining positions. 2 4 Brokers under such circum-
stances, the authors maintained, cannot insist upon written
contracts and, therefore, the court should be more receptive
to claims of equitable estoppel.325
At the time of the Buckaloo decision, Franklin was the
last California Supreme Court case to have addressed the es-
toppel issue. The Franklin dictum spawned justified spec-
ulation that the court was merely waiting for appropriate
facts and pleadings to establish the availability of estoppel to
bar the purportedly harsh and unjustified effect of Civil Code
section 1624(d).327
Importantly, Franklin was not an extraordinary case,
and the ability of brokers to raise estoppel under parallel cir-
cumstances would have abrogated the statute.328 Although
the Phillippe court ultimately ruled soundly against brokers
in this regard twelve years later, it was in this uncertain at-
320. Buckaloo, 537 P.2d 865.
321. See id. at 868.
322. MILLER & STARR, supra note 33, § 1.54; Englund, supra note 86; Fox,
supra note 84, at 602, 609. See generally Lawrence L. Lasser, The Real Estate
Broker's Commission - Oral Agreements and the Statute of Frauds, 10
RUTGERS L. REV. 410 (1955-1956) (criticizing the New Jersey real estate bro-
kers' statute of frauds).
323. Englund, supra note 86, at 1513-14.
324. MILLER & STARR, supra note 33, § 1.54.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Englund, supra note 86, at 1513-14.
328. Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279, 1288 (Cal. 1987).
1996] 1255
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
mosphere that the Buckaloo court weighed the formal re-
quirement of section 1624(d) against a broker's claimed loss
of an advantageous relationship.3 29 There, the high court im-
plicitly discounted the importance of signed writings and
opted to protect a broker who claimed to have performed a
valuable service in bringing together the transacting
parties. 3 °
C. An Adequate Protection for Brokers: Intentional
Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
Recovery Against Transacting Parties in
Circumstances Involving Fraudulent
Misrepresentation
Although the Buckaloo tort does not require a showing of
fraudulent conduct by the defendant, the supreme court was
aware that its holding would protect brokers against de-
ceit. 331 After Buckaloo, a broker who loses a commission
through the intentional acts of a transacting party may ob-
tain recovery based upon intentional interference with pro-
spective economic advantage. 3 2 As the Phillippe court ac-
knowledged, brokers, despite their presumed knowledge of
the law, must be protected against fraud. 3  Otherwise, their
efforts may be appropriated without compensation. 3 4 This
weakens the incentive to provide brokerage services and,
thereby, increases the economic costs associated with buying
and selling real property.335
It is not surprising, therefore, that the prevention of
fraud by transacting parties played an important - albeit
implicit - role in the Buckaloo rationale.336 This is illus-
trated by an examination of the Buckaloo court's use of prece-
dent: specifically, Golden v. Anderson33 v and Friedman v.
329. Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865, 868-69 (Cal. 1975), overruled by
Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
330. See id. at 868-74.
331. See id. at 872.
332. Id. at 868.
333. Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279, 1291-92 (Cal. 1987).
334. See Friedman v. Jackson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 129 (Ct. App. 1968); Golden v.
Anderson, 64 Cal. Rptr. 404 (Ct. App. 1967); Harris v. Perl, 197 A.2d 359 (N.J.
1964).
335. Perlman, supra note 28, at 124.
336. Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865, 872 (Cal. 1975), overruled by Della
Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
337. 64 Cal. Rptr. 404 (Ct. App. 1967).
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Jackson.338 Each of these cases merited elaborate discussion
in the Buckaloo opinion and involved fraud perpetuated by a
real estate buyer that was intended to deprive the plaintiff-
broker of a commission.3 39 The Buckaloo panel observed that
"[w]here fraud is involved, as in Golden, the actionable wrong
stands out in bold relief."
340
In Golden, the buyers acquired the property through the
use of a straw person. In Friedman, the buyers led the seller
to believe that a friend had brought the property to their at-
tention. In both cases, one transacting party committed a
fraudulent misrepresentation against the other and, as a re-
sult, the broker suffered the loss of an advantageous
relationship.
D. Buckaloo Goes Too Far: Liability Imposed on
Transacting Parties Without a Hint of
Misrepresentation
Buckaloo differs from Golden and Friedman: there was
no hint of misrepresentation committed by the buyer in Buck-
aloo.341' As early as 1941, the California Court of Appeal had
expressly considered this issue: whether a buyer, who other-
wise acts lawfully, may be liable for inducing a seller to stand
upon the legal rights that section 1624(d) affords. 342 The
Sweeley court concluded that such conduct was not
actionable.343
In 1975, the Buckaloo court arrived at the opposite con-
clusion.344 In reaching this decision, the Buckaloo court ne-
glected to distinguish, criticize, or disapprove of the Sweeley
holding. 345 Four years later, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts implicitly rejected the Buckaloo rationale.3 4 s Instead,
section 772 of the Restatement follows the Sweeley approach
and cites Sweeley in the comments following that section. 47
In pertinent part, section 772 reads: "One who intentionally
338. 72 Cal. Rptr. 129 (Ct. App. 1968).
339. Friedman, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 129; Golden, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07.
340. Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 872.
341. See id.
342. See Sweeley v. Gordon, 118 P.2d 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).
343. Id.
344. Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 872.
345. See id. at 868-82.
346. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 (1979).
347. Id.
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causes a third person not to perform a contract or not to enter
into a prospective contractual relation with another does not
interfere improperly with the other's contractual relations, by
giving the third person (a) truthful information .... 1,348
Illustration B, above, demonstrates how Buckaloo estab-
lishes liability even where the buyer-defendant has merely
imparted truthful information to the seller4.3 9 The buyer in-
forms the seller that section 1624(d) bars enforcement of the
oral commission arrangement. So informed, the seller re-
fuses to pay the broker. Under the Restatement view, the
broker cannot recover the orally promised commission from
the buyer through tortious interference.3 0
E. The Buckaloo Fact Pattern: A Case Study in How to
Eviscerate the Real Estate Brokers' Statute of
Frauds
The need to protect brokers against interlopers must be
weighed against the legislature's insistence upon written bro-
kerage contracts. Ironically, the Buckaloo decision provides a
fact pattern that amply illustrates the importance of section
1624(d) in protecting the public from an overzealous broker.
Recall that Arness, the buyer, desired to locate and
purchase coastal development property.35' For that purpose,
she enlisted the services of a real estate salesperson.3 52
While accompanied by her daughter and the salesperson, she
discovered "Dark Gulch," a potentially suitable property upon
348. Id. Comment b addresses this privilege in strong language:
There is of course no liability for interference with a contract or with a
prospective contractual relation on the part of one who merely gives
truthful information to another. The interference in this instance is
clearly not improper. This is true even though the facts are marshaled
in such a way that they speak for themselves and the person to whom
the information is given immediately recognizes them as a reason for
breaking his contract or refusing to deal with another. It is also true
whether or not the information is requested.
Id. cmt. b.
349. See supra part IV.A.2.
350. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 (1979). On October 12, 1995,
the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Della Penna v. Toyota Motor
Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995). See supra text accompanying notes
17-27. There, the high court considered at length and endorsed the Restate-
ment view. Della Penna, 902 P.2d at 741.
351. Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865, 867 (Cal. 1975), overruled by Della
Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
352. See id.
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which a sign had been erected, reading "For Sale - Contact
Your Local Broker."3 5 3 The salesperson must have been un-
familiar with the property. 54
Together, the group entered the plaintiff-broker's real es-
tate office.3 5 Shortly after their entrance and before the dis-
cussion turned to Dark Gulch, the salesperson asked if the
plaintiff "cooperated with other brokers."3 56 By positing this
question, the salesperson hoped to ensure that the plaintiff
would not believe himself to be entitled to a selling agent's
commission if the salesperson later negotiated the purchase
of Dark Gulch on Arness' behalf.3 57
Although the plaintiff may have cooperated with other
brokers on occasion, the plaintiff was not in a position to coop-
erate with another broker on the sale of Dark Gulch. Cooper-
ation means commission splitting and, under the implied
agreement that the broker later claimed to have had with the
seller, the plaintiff was not entitled to a commission unless he
procured the buyer. 58
The plaintiff concealed this fact to prevent the buyer and
the salesperson from dealing directly with the seller.359 In
other words, the plaintiff imposed an unwanted brokerage re-
lationship upon Dark Gulch's owner, thereby defeating the
cautionary purpose of section 1624(d) identified by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. 6 °
In some manner not explained by the Buckaloo opinion,
the buyer discovered this concealment and purchased the
property without the plaintiff's further assistance.3 61 Arness
could be liable under Buckaloo's holding for informing the
seller that an unwritten listing is not enforceable, if that in-
formation induced the seller to refuse to pay the broker's
353. See id.
354. See id.
355. See id.
356. Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at 867. Had the plaintiff possessed an enforceable
exclusive listing with the seller, the plaintiff would have been entitled to a com-
mission notwithstanding the salesperson having procured the buyer. See supra
note 253. By asking if the plaintiff "cooperated with other brokers," the sales-
person questioned his willingness to split his commission with a selling broker.
See supra note 253.
357. See supra note 253.
358. See supra note 240.
359. See BowMAN & MILLIGAN, supra note 65, § 3.14.
360. See Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865, 866-68 (Cal. 1975), overruled by
Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
361. Id. at 867.
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commission. 6 2 This ignores the Restatement's truthful in-
formation privilege.363
This result also eviscerates the other goal of section
1624(d) identified in Phillippe.36 4 The broker's resulting ac-
tion against Arness vividly illustrates how the Buckaloo tort
subjects transacting parties to multiple commission claims
arising out of a single transaction. Assume that at trial, the
fact finder believed the plaintiff had been the procuring cause
of Arness' purchase under an unwritten brokerage agree-
ment. 65 It is likely that Arness or the seller had already
paid a commission to the salesperson accompanying her at
the close of escrow. A judgment awarding the plaintiff a com-
mission would subject the transacting parties to multiple lia-
bility for commissions arising out of a single transaction. The
Phillippe court observed that section 1624(d) strives to pre-
vent this.366
Common experience alone may be an insufficient protec-
tion against a sophisticated and overzealous broker. In the
ordinary course of affairs, it is unusual to incur liability
merely by entering into a place of business open to the public
and engaging the proprietor in casual conversation. This im-
putes to the general public an understanding of the doctrine
of procuring cause. This pitfall for the unwary is especially
troublesome due to the Buckaloo plaintiff's pecuniary inter-
est in concealing the tenuousness of his relationship with
Dark Gulch's owner. 67
The plaintiff was aware that he lacked an enforceable
brokerage agreement on Dark Gulch.3 68 To protect his inter-
ests and satisfy the statute of frauds, the plaintiff should
have asked the buyer to execute a written buyer-brokerage
agreement prior to discussing the advantages and disadvan-
tages of Dark Gulch. This contract would have stated that if
the buyer purchased Dark Gulch as a result of the plaintiff's
362. Id. at 872.
363. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 (1979).
364. Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279, 1289-90 (Cal. 1987).
365. In overruling the trial court's sustaining of the defendants' demurrer,
the California Supreme Court accepted as true the plaintiff-broker's claim to
have been the procuring cause of the Arness purchase. Buckaloo, 537 P.2d at
866-67.
366. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1289 n.12.
367. See BowMAN & MILLIGAN, supra note 65, § 3.14.
368. A licensed broker is conclusively presumed to know the requirement of
Civil Code § 1624(d). Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1286.
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efforts, the buyer guaranteed that the broker would receive a
specified commission, if not from the seller then from the
buyer.3 6 9 Presented with such a document, Arness would
have understood the potential importance of her single, per-
haps brief, conversation with the plaintiff. Had she signed
that document, the broker would then have possessed an en-
forceable commission claim under section 1624(d).
V. PROPOSAL
Two decades ago, the California Supreme Court set forth
those five elements that a real estate broker must establish to
recover lost compensation based upon the tort of intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage. 370 Buck-
aloo v. Johnson371 requires:
(1) an economic relationship between broker and vendor
or broker and vendee containing the probability of future
economic benefit to the broker, (2) knowledge by the de-
fendant of the existence of the relationship, (3) intentional
acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the
relationship, (4) actual disruption of the relationship, (5)
damages to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of
the defendant.372
In instances where the defendant is a transacting party (i.e.
seller or buyer), the author offers the following revision for
California courts in their struggle to apply the Della Penna
decision in the real estate brokerage setting: "(3) intentional
ae4s fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the defend-
ant designed to disrupt the relationship."3 73
369. Near the specified commission, the buyer would have also found the leg-
islature's required commission disclaimer. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 10147.5 (West 1994). See also supra note 288 and accompanying text (setting
forth required statutory language). The specified commission rate or amount
would have been hand written or typed in, as the legislature has mandated that
the commission rate not be pre-printed in such forms. See CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 10147.5 (West 1994). Moreover, this agreement would have stated a
definite termination date. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10176(f) (West 1994).
370. Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865, 872 (Cal. 1975), overruled by Della
Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
371. Id.
372. Id. at 872.
373. On October 12, 1995, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995). See
supra text accompanying notes 17-27. There, in a non-real estate brokerage
context, the high court altered the Buckaloo tort to require a showing of "wrong-
ful acts," rather than merely "intentional acts." Della Penna, 902 P.2d at 741-
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A. Shields Brokers Against Unjustified Interference
This proposed revision harmonizes the Buckaloo holding
with the supreme court's more recent discussion of Civil Code
section 1624, subdivision (d), in Phillippe v. Shapell Indus-
tries.3 74 There, the high court articulated the "sound policy
considerations" favoring strict application of the statute. 75
To foster compliance, the Phillippe court refused to allow a
broker to raise equitable estoppel to bar a transacting party's
statute of fraud defense. 76 To assuage brokers' fears that
this would leave them unprotected, however, the supreme
court carefully explained that such a remedy is available
where the broker reasonably relies upon a misrepresentation
of the defendant.377 Where, for example, a broker is informed
that the principal's promise to pay a commission has been re-
duced to writing - when in fact it has not - the broker may
raise this equitable bar against the principal's statute of
frauds defense.378
In the same way, allowing brokers to recover against
transacting parties based upon tortious interference only
upon a showing of the transacting party acted deceitfully also
affords adequate protection. For example, as allegedly hap-
pened in Buckaloo3 7 9 buyers occasionally locate suitable
property with the assistance of a broker and then circumvent
the broker by dealing directly with the property's owner. 8 °
Often the transaction is completed but no commission is
paid.3 81
Where the broker has complied with section 1624(d) by
obtaining a signed brokerage agreement, the broker is enti-
51. The court expressly refrained from going "beyond approving the require-
ment of a showing of wrongfulness as part of the plaintiff's case." Id. at 741.
The case "to be made for adopting refinement to that element of the tort" was
left to be "consider[ed] on another day, and in another case." Id. When that
case arises on facts substantially similar to Buckaloo v. Johnson, the author
offers this proposal as a means of reconciling the California Supreme Court's
decisions in Buckaloo, Phillippe, and Della Penna.
374. 743 P.2d 1279 (Cal. 1987).
375. Phillippe, 743 P.2d at 1288-90.
376. Id. at 1284-88.
377. Id. at 1291-92.
378. Id. at 1291-92.
379. Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865, 866-67 (Cal. 1975), overruled by
Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 902 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1995).
380. See Perlman, supra note 28, at 124-25.
381. See id.
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tled to enforce that contract directly against the seller.
Where the broker has merely an unwritten contract, the bro-
ker will be barred by the statute of frauds from recovering
directly upon that contract.3 8 2 Moreover, absent a showing
that the seller acted fraudulently, the broker will not be al-
lowed to assert equitable estoppel to defeat the seller's stat-
ute of frauds defense. 8 s
B. Effectuates the Sound Policy Reasons Supporting the
Real Estate Brokers' Statute of Frauds
The broker's incentive to bring a tort action against an-
other transacting party (the buyer, in the above example) is
naturally heightened where the statute of frauds bars an ac-
tion against the seller.38 4 Because transacting parties stand
in the same financial position with respect to the payment of
resultant brokerage expenses, a cause of action based upon
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
is essentially equivalent to direct recovery on the unwritten
promise. 85 Under the revision to the Buckaloo tort proposed
here, however, the broker will also be required to demon-
strate fraudulent conduct as an element of tortious interfer-
ence. Allowing such recovery without some hint of misrepre-
sentation eviscerates the statute of frauds.3 6 In this way,
the Buckaloo tort renders the public vulnerable to the imposi-
tion of unwanted brokerage relationships 387 and subject to
the unfounded and multiple claims of brokers.388
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has long desired to protect the
public by having real estate brokerage contracts in writing.
To further this goal, legislation rendering unwritten agree-
ments invalid was enacted more than a century ago. Even at
this early date, the legislature seemingly realized that the
very nature of the real estate services too often creates un-
382. Phillippe v. Shapell Indus., 743 P.2d 1279, 1283-87 (Cal. 1987).
383. Id. at 1291-92.
384. Perlman, supra note 28, at 126.
385. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
386. Perlman, supra note 28, at 126.
387. See supra part II.A.1.
388. See supra part II.A.2.
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wanted brokerage relationships and generates unfounded
and multiple claims by brokers.
After three decades of uncertainty surrounding the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel and its potential to abrogate the
real estate brokers' statute of frauds, the California Supreme
Court, in Phillippe v. Shapell Industries, recognized the stat-
ute's "sound policy considerations" and insisted upon its rig-
orous application. Specifically, the Phillippe court held that a
broker may not raise equitable estoppel to bar a Civil Code
section 1624, subdivision (d) defense. An exception is made
only where the defendant has engaged in fraudulent conduct
which the broker, charged with knowledge of the statute of
frauds, reasonably relies upon.
The author has proposed broadening this holding to in-
clude instances where brokers seek damages against trans-
acting parties (i.e. sellers and buyers) based upon intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage. Under
the former authority of Buckaloo v. Johnson - a case decided
more than a decade before Phillippe - brokers could recover
a brokerage fee in tort from a transacting party who merely
advises the broker's promisor that unwritten brokerage
agreements cannot be enforced. The availability of such a
cause of action without a hint of misrepresentation eviscer-
ates the real estate brokers' statute of frauds.
Perry J. Woodward*
* The author wishes to dedicate this effort to Patricia Ann Good. Thanks,
Mom.
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